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For decades, many have been concerned over pork barrel politics in Congress with
power over the allocation of federal spending recently flowing towards the presidency
as a counter. But what if presidents pursue policies that also channel federal grants to
parts of the country that are electorally useful? In new research, Douglas Kriner and
Andrew Reeves find that presidents allocate more federal resources (which are worth
billions) to swing states, states which reliably back them in elections, and those which
elect co-partisans that they are able to build coalitions with. 
When it comes to pork barrel politics, Congress has repeatedly looked to the president
to save it from itself.  For instance, the Republican-controlled 104th Congress passed
the Line Item Veto Act in 1996, giving President Clinton the authority to strike “wasteful”
spending provisions in legislation.  In 2010 following the midterm elections, the
Republican House adopted a ban on earmarks, in effect giving more power to the
executive departments and agencies over how federal spending is allocated.  Despite
a chorus of support for delegating these decisions to the executive branch, a few have
voiced concerns over the increased influence of the executive branch in the distribution of federal
dollars.  Former Member of Congress Lee Hamilton (D-IN) complained in 2010 that, in passing
earmark reform, Congress had “yet again opt[ed] to diminish itself while strengthening the President.”
While delegation to the president can break the gridlock in Washington, we argue that it does not
produce an equitable allocation of federal resources across the country.  Rather, electoral and partisan
forces drive presidents to prioritize the needs and desires of some Americans over others.  As a result,
increased presidential power will continue to produce significant inequalities in the distribution of
federal reflecting the president’s political interests. 
Members of Congress wear two hats simultaneously.  On one hand, they are members of the national
legislature charged with crafting policies that serve the needs of the nation.  Yet, they are also
representatives of their narrow geographic constituencies, accountable for meeting the needs of their
local constituents.  The result is that congressional politics, particularly budgetary politics, are often
parochial, with powerful members using their leverage to bring home the bacon for their constituents at
the expense of a rational and efficient allocation of resources.
Presidents, by contrast, are elected by the nation as a whole.  This difference, it is argued, insulates
presidents from parochial impulses and encourages presidents to pursue policies that benefit the
nation as a whole, rather than a select few.  If true, delegation to the president should produce superior
policy outcomes.  The future Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan made this very argument in a 2001
piece in the Harvard Law Review.
We argue that this logic is fundamentally flawed.  It ignores the electoral, partisan, and coalitional
forces that drive presidents, like members of Congress, to be particularistic: that is, to prioritize the
needs and desires of some citizens over others when pursuing their agendas.  By analyzing the
allocation of more than $8.5 trillion of federal grants across the country from 1984 through 2008, we
show that presidents have created systematic political inequalities in who enjoys the benefits of federal
spending that dwarf those created by Congress.
Three incentives encourage presidents to be particularistic.  First, presidents do indeed have a national
constituency.  However, voters do not directly choose the next occupant of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. 
Rather, the Electoral College does.  Over the past thirty years, an increasingly small number of states
have wielded disproportionate influence in selecting the next president.  Presidents have strong
incentives to target federal resources to court voters in swing states.
But presidents are more than just reelection-seekers.  They are also partisan leaders.  As such,
presidents pursue policies that systematically channel federal dollars disproportionately to parts of the
country that form the backbone of their partisan base.
Finally, to succeed legislatively, presidents must build coalitions.  In contemporary politics, presidents
have been forced to rely heavily, often almost exclusively, on co-partisans in Congress to advance their
legislative agendas.  To court favor on Capitol Hill and to maintain their party’s strength in Congress,
presidents also have incentives to reward constituencies that elect co-partisans to the legislature with
bigger shares of federal largesse.
Analyzing the geographic allocation of all federal grant dollars from 1984 through 2008, we find
evidence of all three forms of presidential particularism.  The result is massive presidentially induced
inequalities in the allocation of federal dollars across the country.
Controlling for a host of factors that shape the amount of grant spending different parts of the country
receive, we find that presidents systematically channel a disproportionate share of federal dollars to
swing states.  Our analysis shows that communities in swing states consistently receive more federal
grant dollars than comparable communities in uncompetitive states.  Moreover, presidents are
particularly eager to court voters in swing states as the next election approaches.  In presidential
election years, constituencies in swing states receive even larger infusions of federal grant dollars.
The sums are substantial.  For example, the map in Figure 1 illustrates the estimated increase in grant
spending that each swing state received in 2008 simply by virtue of being electorally competitive.  In
2008, four pivotal swing states – Florida, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania – received more than $1
billion in additional grant spending, by virtue of being swing states.  Finally, our results show that in
presidential reelection years, swing state targeting is at its peak.
Figure 1 – Estimated Increases in Grant Spending Secured by Swing States, 2008
Presidents also look after their partisan base.  Communities in core states – that is, states that reliably
back the president’s party at the polls – also receive disproportionate shares of federal largesse.  For
large red and blue states, such as California and Texas, billions of dollars are on the line at each
presidential contest.  For example, the map in Figure 2 illustrates the estimated increase in grant
spending that a number of states received in 2008 because they reliably backed the incumbent
Republican Party, rather than the Democratic Party.  Our model predicts that in 2008 Texas received $2
billion in additional grant spending by virtue of being a core Republican state.  If John Kerry had won
the 2004 race, Texas would have lost significant funds, while New York and California would have
gained significantly.
Figure 2 – Estimated Increases in Grant Spending Secured by Core States, 2008
Finally, presidents also target federal dollars to constituencies that elect co-partisans to Congress.  We
find that the median county that sent a member of the president’s party to the House in the last election
receives $8.6 million more in grant spending, on average, than a comparable county that voted for a
member of the opposition party for Congress.
The political inequalities produced by these presidential particularistic forces dwarf those produced by
congressional parochialism.  Majority party members have some capacity to secure more federal grant
dollars for their constituents.  However, the magnitude of this effect pales in comparison to the
advantages presidents secure for swing or core constituencies.  Moreover, we find no evidence that
members of key committees are systematically able to secure unequal shares of federal largesse for
their constituencies.
On many policy questions, presidents undoubtedly bring a different, more national perspective than do
members of Congress.  However, electoral and partisan incentives result in presidents pursuing
policies that generate significant political inequalities in the allocation of federal dollars across the
country.
This article is based on the paper ‘Presidential Particularism and Divide-the-Dollar Politics’, in the
American Political Science Review.  The ideas in this blog post are developed further in their
forthcoming book, The Particularistic President: Executive Branch Politics and Political Inequality.
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